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The ontology of the Embodied Person View 
 
In this paper I argue in favor of an account of personal identity based on the Embodied Person 
View (EP) advocated by Derek Parfit.  The main focus is to evaluate how well this view fares as 1
an account of personal ontology. Since EP as presented in ​We Are Not Human Beings​  1) is 
vaguely formulated in the sense that it makes room for further explicating 2) has received 
relevant criticism that needs to be met for it to sustain its strength, I attempt to explicate and 
recast the view in a way that hopefully enables it to answer some of the objections made against 
it. There are three areas of criticism: the first concerns EP's alleged commitment to Thinking 
Subject Minimalism and the problems that follow from it, the second concerns identity over time 
and the last concerns the ontology of EP. Since the main focus of this paper is personal ontology, 
the most important objections are those of the first and last category. However, I attempt to 
answer the other objections here as well since the view’s strength partly depends on its 
consequences in other aspects of personal identity. I argue that the ontological objections can be 
resolved by adopting an ontology of temporal parts,  and the kind of temporal parts ontology 2
examined for this purpose is the stage view. In the last section of the paper I endeavour to draw 
conclusions regarding the strength of the revisioned version of EP in light of the foregoing 
discussion.  
 
Now for some opening clarifications. Since there are several ways of defining “person”, no 
single introductory definition is offered here; instead I try to make explicit throughout the text 
which one is posited and by whom. A second reason to this is that defining “person” is the 
problem of personhood, and not that of personal ontology, and I try to avoid getting too 
enmeshed in the wrong questions.  Another important distinction to note before moving on is 3
that this paper covers numerical identity and not qualitative identity.  Since questions about 4
persistence is important to the topic, this needs to be spelled out. In other words, what I am after 
when discussing identity over time is not whether you and your future self are qualitatively 
identical. The kind of identity relevant to this paper is the numerical identity that holds between 
you and some future self of yours.  
1. The Embodied Person View 
In ​We Are Not Human Beings​ , Derek Parfit introduces and argues in favor of EP,  and in this 5
section I attempt to make this view as explicit as possible. The posit of EP that needs to be 
mentioned first is the criterion that for something to be a person, it has to be a person in the 
1 Parfit, Derek. “We Are Not Human Beings”, ​Philosophy​ , 87(1), 5–28, 2012. doi: 10.1017/S0031819111000520.  
2 Olson, Eric. “On Parfit’s View That We Are Not Human Beings”, ​Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement​ , 76, 
39-56, 2015. doi:10.1017/S1358246115000107. Here I follow Olson’s proposal, although he himself considers 
temporal parts an unattractive solution to problems of personal ontology (Olson 2007).  
3 ​Olson, Eric. "Personal Identity", ​The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy​ , Spring 2016 Edition, edited by Edward 
N. Zalta. URL: <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/identity-personal/>.  
4 Parfit. ​We Are Not Human Beings​ . 5-6.  
5 Ibid. 17.  
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Lockean sense. The “Lockean sense” preferred by Parfit is his Narrow, Brain-Based 
Psychological Criterion:  
 
If some future person would be uniquely psychologically continuous with me as I am 
now, and this continuity would have its normal cause, enough of the same brain, this 
person would be me. If some future person would neither be uniquely psychologically 
continuous with me as I am now, nor have enough of the same brain, this person would 
not​  be me. In all other cases, there would be no answer to the question whether some 
future person would be me.   6
 
The general Lockean definition of personal identity is simply some (indeterminate) 
psychological criterion, so this narrow criterion differs from it in that it adds to the psychological 
aspect that the relevant mental goings-on of the present person respectively the future person 
needs to be physically realized in the same brain.  Another effect of this is that it cannot be an 7
animalist view, since animalism posits physical continuity instead of psychological continuity.   8
 
The criterion does not say very much about the EP view on personal ontology, but it is the base 
on which the ontological claim of EP rests. It implies that the persistence of a person has 
something to do with some psychological phenomena, but it also demands some physical 
qualification. This leads us to the second, crucial ontological claim of EP, namely that: “human 
animals think by having a conscious thinking part […]” and this part is the person if it meets the 
narrow criterion.f Rather than a ​constitutionalist​  Lockean position according to which a person is 
non-identically constituted by a human animal, EP is a ​non-constitutionalist​  view as it claims 
that a person is a proper ​part​  of a human animal.  Consequently, combining the ontological claim 9
with a commitment to the narrow criterion, the proper part of a human animal which qualifies as 
a person should reasonably be the human animal’s brain (or enough of it). To illustrate this 
further: according to EP, rather than you being a body with some thinking, conscious part, you 
are a thinking, conscious part that has a body. According to EP, we are not essentially animals.   10
1.1. Arguments for the Embodied Person View 
In what follows I will present some arguments in favor of EP. To begin with, it corresponds with 
intuitions concerning the location of the self, such as in brain transplant cases. Intuitively, I 
would expect that if my cerebrum was successfully transplanted into your emptied skull, the 
person who would wake up in your body after the operation would be me. This is the outcome 
that EP entails: when the thinking, conscious part is moved from one body to another, so is the 
person. If that kind of operation was possible, this outcome seems the most plausible to expect. 
This gives EP an advantage over its main rival view, animalism, since a posit of solely biological 
continuity entails the less intuitive outcome that the person who wakes up in your body is you, 
6 Ibid. 6.  
7 Olson, E. T. “On Parfit’s View That We Are Not Human Beings”, ​Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement​ , 76, 
39–56, 2015. doi: 10.1017/S1358246115000107. 39.  
8 ​Olson. ​Personal Identity​ .  
9 ​Blatti, Stephan, "Animalism", ​The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy​ , forthcoming, edited by Edward N. Zalta, 
2016 URL: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/animalism/>.  
10 Parfit. ​We Are Not Human Beings​ . 19.  
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but with a new cerebrum.  For those who are not satisfied with arguments from brain-transplant 11
cases ​qua​  thought experiments, the intuitive strength of EP can be illustrated by some actual 
cases. In cases of conjoined twinning where two separate heads share the same body we would 
not say anything other than that there are two people sharing the same body. One might also 
think that EP has an intuitive advantage in cases where a person enters an irreversible vegetative 
state, arguing that the human being in question does not meet the criteria of EP (by not meeting 
the narrow criterion and - maybe - not having a thinking, conscious part) and that EP therefore 
can explain why the previously existing person does not seem to persist although the human 
animal is still alive, and that we, at the same time, are not sure whether this is the case or not.  12
However, intuitions concerning irreversible vegetative states might vary depending on your 
experiences and which view on personal ontology you are committed to, so I would like to call 
on some extra caution when arguing from this last case.  Conclusively, EP, with its part 13
psychological part physical criteria, seems to grasp some intuitive aspect of personhood which its 
main rival view cannot account for.  
 
The next argument in favor of EP is that it solves what is called the Thinking Part Problem. This 
is a problem for any constitutionalist or animalist view since they are committed to the claim that 
human people are in some way identical to human bodies. The brain indeed seems to be the 
thinking part of an animal. Now the problem is that if you believe that you are an animal, it 
seems as if ​you​ , the animal, only think in a derivative sense from having a thinking part.  This is 14
not a desirable position when your aim is an account of the ontology of ​people​ , since the 
Thinking Part Problem implies that the brain, and not the animal, is the person, as it (seemingly) 
is the best candidate for being the primary, non-derivative thinker. On the other hand, the 
solution to accept this and postulate that we are just brains has serious problems of its own, 
which I do not rehearse here.  Now since EP is a non-constitutionalist view, the Thinking Part 15
Problem does not apply to it. It denies that we are human beings, and states that we really are the 
conscious, thinking, and controlling parts of human animals.  As Parfit puts it: “The Thinking 16
Parts Problem has a thinking parts solution.”   17
 
This stance consequently avoids another common problem for Lockean accounts of personal 
ontology, namely the Too Many Thinkers Problem. It poses a concern for views which to the 
question of the fundamental nature of people would answer that people are more or something 
else than human animals, such as EP. Accordingly, the Too Many Thinkers Problem is an 
argument in favor of animalism, then called the Thinking Animal Argument, and can be 
formulated as follows:  
11 Ibid. 11-13.  
12 Ibid. 17-18.  
13 A significantly different intuition can be found in (Olson 2007).  
14 Olson. ​What Are We?​ . Section 4.2. The name “Thinking Part Problem” is Parfit’s, but the problem itself is the 
same as Olson’s Thinking-Brain Problem.  
15 For a survey of problems for Brain Views, see (Olson 2007).  
16 McMahan, Jeff. ​The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life​ . New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002. Oxford Scholarship Online, 2003. doi: 10.1093/0195079981.001.0001. Cited in: Parfit. ​We Are Not Human 
Beings​ , 14.  
17 Parfit. ​We Are Not Human Beings​ , 14.  
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(P1) Presently sitting in your chair is a human animal. 
(P2) The human animal sitting in your chair is thinking. 
(P3) You are the thinking being sitting in your chair. 
(C) Therefore, the human animal sitting in your chair is you.   18
 
Now, if your view claims that you are something else than the animal, there seem to be two 
thinking beings in your chair - you and the animal. Parfit mentions the Too Many Thinkers 
Problem briefly, stating that there is no problem with a human animal having a part which 
performs a certain task, in this case thinking, in the same way a human animal having its nose as 
its sneezing part does not generate a Too Many Sneezer’s Problem.  I believe there is another 19
way for EP to avoid this problem, which is coherent with Parfit’s answer. The solution is to use 
the claims of EP to revise the Thinking Animal Argument:  
 
(P1) Presently sitting in your chair is a human animal. 
(P2*) The human animal sitting in your chair is thinking in a derivative sense by having a 
thinking part that thinks non-derivatively.  
 
P2* is simply the EP explanation of what is the case in P2. For the revision of P3, what Parfit 
calls the ​own-thinker principle​  needs to be introduced. This was formulated by Olson in favor of 
animalism, but was later hijacked by Parfit, claiming it actually to be in favor of EP.  It says that 20
if there are one derivative thinker and one non-derivative thinker sharing the same thoughts, the 
one that is the person is the non-derivative thinker.  Now, this combined with P2* gives us the 21
rest of the revised argument:  
 
(P3* + OTP)  You are the non-derivative thinker, i.e. the thinking part of the human animal 
sitting in your chair.  
(C*) Therefore, the human animal sitting in your chair is ​not​  you.  
 
Now, one need not have animalist preferences to feel that something is missing here. Some more 
exhaustive account of how people are related to their human animal bodies is needed; otherwise 
the intuitive strength of EP might be impaired. At least two problems can be formulated in line 
with this worry. The Physical Properties Objection claims that since we have physical properties 
such as having certain body parts, those must be part of us, the people. Parfit answers to this 
objection by emphasizing that EP claims us to be ​embodied​  people, and explains this by our use 
18 ​Blatti. ​Animalism​ .  
19 Parfit. ​We Are Not Human Beings​ , 14-15.  
20 Ibid. 18.  
21 Chisholm, Roderick. ​Person and Object​ , Open Court, 1976, 104. Cited in: Olson, E. T. “Animalism and the 
Remnant-Person Problem”,​ ​Philosophical Perspectives on the Self​ , edited by J. Fonseca & J. Gonçalves, 2015, 
21-40.​ http://www.shef.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.173538!/file/lisbon.pdf.  
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of personal pronouns.  According to Parfit personal pronouns are ambiguous, and he argues that 22
we already use them accordingly (eg., if your trousers were splashed with mud, you could say “I 
am splashed with mud” without anyone raising their eyebrows). This explains how we can use 
pronouns to refer to our bodies while at the same time believing that we are not human animals. 
In other words, an ambiguous use of pronouns combined with the embodied-relation between 
person and animal eliminates the Physical Properties Objection.   23
 
There is also an epistemic problem with EP, despite its solution to the Thinking Animal 
Argument. The solution is supposed to show that the primary thinker, viz. the person, is not the 
human animal but its thinking part, and accordingly deny that we are human animals. Important 
to note though is that there are two thinkers: the primary, non-derivatively thinking person and 
the secondary, derivative - but still thinking - animal. What EP has done is to explicate the 
qualitative differences between the two; consequently, there are not too many people. But are 
there too many thinkers? The epistemic problem is this: if both think your thoughts 
simultaneously, how could you ever know if you are the animal thinking some thought 
derivatively or the person thinking the thought non-derivatively?  Parfit asserts that on an 24
unambiguous conception of personal pronouns this seems to be a problem, but on an ambiguous 
conception of pronouns it does not need to be.  To make the answer accessible, I think some 25
suppositions of EP need to be spelled out. As we have seen, EP demarcates the differences 
between human animal and person. This might give the impression of them being very separated 
from each other. But despite of their different properties, they have a very close connection. To 
get the picture it is essential to see that even if there are two thinkers, there is only one episode of 
thought. This means that the way in which the animal thinks derivatively is in an especially 
strong sense. Everything that that the animal understands it does by having a part, the person, 
that does. This includes thoughts such as “Outer-I thinks because Inner-I does”, since without the 
understanding that Inner-I provides with, Outer-I would not have understood the thought.  This 26
view of our connection with our human animal bodies might actually be an intuitive advantage in 
that it explains how we can feel closely connected to our human bodies, such that we can refer to 
it by using first person pronouns, while at the same time be convinced that we could survive 
losing most of it.  
1.2. Arguments against the Embodied Person View  
I now move on to criticism of EP put forward by Olson. We have already stated that the narrow 
criterion implies that the thinking part that is the person according to EP is the brain. Olson notes 
that for it not to be an arbitrary choice of part, EP needs to commit itself to a principle of 
Thinking-Subject Minimalism: that a true thinker must be made up of ​all and only​  the objects 
directly involved in its thinking. Without such a restriction, the thinking part could be the head, 
22 ​What henceforth is said about personal pronouns I count as commitments of EP.  
23 Parfit. ​We Are Not Human Beings​ , 20.  
24 Parfit. ​We Are Not Human Beings​ . 20. Quoting: Olson, E.T. “Thinking Animals and the Reference of ‘I’”, 
Philosophical Topics​  30, 2002, 189-208.  
25 Parfit. ​We Are Not Human Beings​ . 20-24.  
26 Ibid. “Inner-I” and “Outer-I” are two more specific uses of “I”, which Parfit introduces to give examples of  how 
the aforementioned ambiguity can make sense of there being two qualitatively different thinkers thinking the same 
thought.  
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the upper half of the body - or the entire animal.  In this paper I assume that EP does and in fact 27
needs to endorse this criterion. Olson mentions three problematic aspects of minimalism. First, 
there is a problem of how and whether it could be generalized. Since thinking is an activity 
performed by human animals, should not minimalism also hold for other activities, such as 
walking, talking, eating, etc.? If so, a person would only walk in a derivative sense by being the 
part of the animal that calls on other parts of the animal to carry out certain activities, such as 
walking.  To accept this more or less odd consequence of minimalism might seem like a small 28
price to pay considering the strengths of EP at large. Perhaps there are ways to avoid this 
altogether, but regardless of how innocuous the objection is, EP faces harder problems.  
 
Olson’s second worry poses a more stressing problem for EP to solve: how do you know which 
parts are and which are not directly involved in someone’s thinking? For instance, which role 
does the parts of the human body that enables the brain to function, such as those involved in 
supplying it with oxygenated blood, have in this context, and why should they be considered 
indirectly rather than directly involved in a person’s mental processes? EP needs to provide with 
a strategy that makes us able to distinguish the one from the other, otherwise its choice of the 
brain as being the thinking conscious part of a human animal is alarmingly arbitrary. If EP 
cannot say which parts of a human animal are directly involved in its thinking, it thereby cannot 
say what constitutes the person, which is a serious blow to EP ​qua​  an account of personal 
ontology.   29
 
Regardless of whether EP could solve the two aforementioned problems or not, one separate 
problem with the commitment to minimalism would remain. It arises with the fact that different 
parts of the brain are involved in different mental activities: the act of remembering names are 
governed by certain neurons, while imagining faces are governed by some other, etc. Since only 
certain neurons are directly involved in certain thoughts, according to minimalism, these neurons 
are the primary thinker of these thoughts. So it seems that the thinking part EP suggests in fact 
consists of a large number of primary thinkers, none of which could possibly meet the narrow 
criterion. This combined with the facts that it can be hard to distinguish which neurons are 
directly involved in what, and that they might overlap, makes this a hard problem for EP to 
answer to.   30
 
Even though questions concerning demarcation constitutes a very interesting area of concern, I 
am not sure about which impact it should be seen as having on EP. It certainly should lie in the 
interest of any proponent of EP to ascertain for example which parts are and are not directly 
involved in one's thinking, but the question does not appear to be a purely philosophical one. It 
seems to me that the possibility of progress in this question is to a large extent, if not solely, 
depends on empirical research. If we could know for certain that there could never be any 
progress in neither ​a priori​  nor ​a posteriori​  investigation in the matter, then the problems of 
minimalism would be a serious concern for the proponent of EP. But as long as we cannot 
establish the inefficacy of such investigation it might be more fitting to view the questions of 
27 Olson. ​On Parfit’s View​ . 49.  
28 Ibid. 49-50.  
29 Ibid. 50.  
30 Ibid. 51.  
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demarcation as a still markedly unexplored area, rather than viewing EP's inability to account for 
the exact boundaries of a thinking part as a fatal shortcoming of the view.  
 
I now move on to discuss a potentially problematic consequence of EP concerning persistence. 
Recall that one important asset of the view is that its results in cases concerning identity over 
time, such as the brain-transplant case mentioned earlier, match commonplace intuitions about 
persistence. Because of this, the following criticism needs an answer since it questions EP's 
ability to explain identity over time. But before we continue, it is important to observe a way in 
which my reading of Parfit differs from Olson’s. I count the narrow criterion as a part of EP, 
while Olson does not. However, he holds Parfit accountable for positing both what he interprets 
EP to be (viz. the ontological claim of EP) and the narrow criterion (and particularly the 
compatibility of the two!), so the difference is really just terminological - at least at this stage. In 
order to avoid confusion I stick to my terminology while discussing Olson’s criticism, but for the 
sake of perspicuity, let us repeat and formulate EP as following:  
 
(​The ontological claim of EP​ ) A person is the thinking, conscious part of a human animal.   31
 
(​The Narrow, Brain-Based Psychological Criterion​ ) If some future person would be uniquely 
psychologically continuous with me as I am now, and this continuity would have its normal 
cause, enough of the same brain, this person would be me. If some future person would 
neither be uniquely psychologically continuous with me as I am now, nor have enough of the 
same brain, this person would not be me. In all other cases, there would be no answer to the 
question whether some future person would be me.   32
 
With these clarifications in mind, we can move on to the criticism. Olson writes:  
 
Physiologists tell us that my brain came into being early in gestation, long before it could 
support any mental activity. If I am my brain, as the embodied-part view appears to 
imply, then I must have persisted then without any psychological continuity.  33
 
This, Olson argues, is incompatible with the narrow criterion because it claims psychological 
continuity to be necessary for a person to persist.  First, I would like to point out that I believe 34
Olson has overlooked one attribute of the narrow criterion, which when present makes his 
argument miss its target. We have already noted that conformity with intuitions is important to 
EP. What Parfit seems to do is to explicate a definition of “person” which correlates with our 
intuitive use of the word. Keeping this in mind, we should take into account that the term 
“person” is open-textured, something that is accounted for by the narrow criterion since it leaves 
open what would happen to a person in “all other cases”. If Parfit would attempt to answer what 
would happen in those cases where our commonplace conception of “person” does not provide 
31 It might be worth noting that EP could be phrased in a broader sense to include the possibility of non-human 
people, but since the point of this paper is not to discuss the question of the existence of non-human people, I believe 
this narrower formulation serves the purpose of the relevant discussion better.  
32 Parfit. ​We Are Not Human Beings​ , 6-7.  
33 Olson. ​On Parfit’s View​ , 51.  
34 Ibid. 51-52.  
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an answer, the narrow criterion might become less intuitive, in which case he would risk losing 
this asset.  Olson’s argument presupposes that Parfit’s aim is to phrase a more or less exhaustive 35
explanation of our identity over time and that if this is not accomplished, which Olson suggests, 
EP's explanation of our persistence conditions is “radically incomplete”.  However, as we have 36
seen, Parfit need not agree on these terms, and might even appreciate how his criterion illustrates 
the open texture of “person”. Moving on to the incompatibility between the ontological claim of 
EP and the narrow criterion, we need to look at the ontological claim. In the case of the fetus 
which has developed a brain that lacks mental activity, the answer to the criticism is evident: this 
human animal does not have any part that is thinking or conscious, and is therefore not a person. 
And since it is no person, the fact that it has a brain is not incompatible with the narrow criterion 
(the lack of mental activity makes it impossible for it to be psychologically continuous with 
anything).  
 
The last criticism concerns the ontology of EP. We have already noted that the ontological claim 
of EP is that a person is the thinking, conscious part of a human animal. This claim combined 
with the narrow criterion implies that the part which is the person is the brain,  but not the brain 37
in any state. According to EP, a person consists of a brain which is psychologically continuous in 
the sense mentioned in the narrow criterion. Consequently, a brain lacking the capacity of 
supporting mental activity is not a person. Let us call the ones that do support the kind of mental 
activity needed to meet the narrow criterion ​functioning brains​ . This distinction between brains 
and functioning brains has some alarming and quite confusing consequences, which I will try to 
make as clear as possible. First, we need to take a look at what Parfit says about the relation 
between person and brain:  
 
The thinking part of a human animal, we could say, is related to this animal’s cerebrum 
or upper brain in a way that is roughly similar to that in which this animal is related to its 
whole body. Most of us distinguish between ourselves and our bodies. If we deny that 
human animals ​are​  their bodies, we could similarly deny that the thinking part of these 
animals is their upper brain.  [author italics] 38
 
Because the thinking part and the brain are coextensive in the same way an animal and its body 
are coextensive, Parfit’s claim seems to imply that there are two coextensive objects which both 
qualify as thinking parts, only differing in one sense: by having different modal properties, i.e. 
persistence conditions. When the organism dies, the functioning brain disappears and the regular 
brain persists.  I do not know if Parfit would agree on this or not, but let us for the sake of 39
argument assume that this is an inevitable effect of EP. If this is the case, EP has a Thinking Part 
Problem the like of which it was supposed to avoid (see section 1.1.), and the question remains - 
35 Possible ground for that this in fact is Parfit goal can be found in EP and the ambiguity of personal pronouns, 
where he argues from our everyday use of them. See also (Parfit 2007): “ … nor is [EP] merely a philosophical 
invention, since it states more clearly what many non-philosophers already believe, or would after reflection 
believe.”  
36 Olson. ​On Parfit’s View​ . 52.  
37 Here I put aside considerations on which parts of the brain the person consists of (just the cerebrum, the cerebrum 
+ brainstem, how much of the cerebrum that need to persist for a person to persist, etc.).  
38 Parfit. ​We Are Not Human Beings​ . 15.  
39 Olson. ​On Parfit’s View​ . 53-55.  
8 
 
 
 
how do you know which part you are? In this case there are two ​coextensive​  but modally distinct 
parts that both qualify as the primary thinker.  Olson mentions another possible consequence of 40
the brain-functioning brain distinction, which he himself does not distinguish from the 
aforementioned consequence, but I do since they need not both be the case. This second possible 
effect of the brain-functioning brain distinction is that the functioning brain is not another object, 
but a property of the brain. In that case, EP risks ending up with an ontology containing one 
separate (thinking, conscious) part for every property the brain has: the waking brain, the 
sleeping brain, the sober brain, etc. All of these brains share spatial (and partly temporal) 
extension with the functioning brain, and assuming that physically identical objects have 
identical mental properties, the waking/sleeping/sober brains should, at the time they exist, also 
qualify as people.  Consequently, this amounts to a new Too Many Thinkers Problem. Olson 41
concludes his article by suggesting how Parfit could solve the problems of functioning brains.  42
The following section is dedicated to examining the consequences of one of Olson’s proposed 
solutions.  
2. Temporal parts 
The best way to resolve the new Thinking Parts Problem for EP, according to Olson, is to adopt 
an ontology of temporal parts. Since he does not go into any particular detail on what a 
commitment of this sort would amount to, this section is dedicated to shedding some more light 
on possible effects of EP combined with an ontology of temporal parts. The kind of temporal 
parts ontology I have chosen to examine for this purpose is the stage view, advocated by eg. Ted 
Sider. It says that people are stages (temporal parts), as opposed to being space time worms (i.e. 
aggregates​  of stages).  Because of this, we act or think in a strict sense but do not persist 43
according to the former, while the latter states the opposite. Since a person according to EP is a 
primary, non-derivative thinker, I find the stage view more fit for the purpose of developing EP.
 Another reason to choose the stage view is that it is coherent with views on persistence in 44
which identity and psychological continuity play a vital role.  Further, for EP more decisive, 45
assets of the stage view will be presented in the following subsection.  
2.1. EP and the stage view 
How the stage view could solve the ontological problems goes hand in hand with its account of 
persistence, so I start by further explicating the stage view and what it says about identity over 
time. According to the stage view, when you speak of a former you, say, the five-year-old child 
you once was, it is not you that you speak of, but a temporal counterpart, a stage, with which you 
stand in some certain relation to. This has the unintuitive effect that people do not persist. How 
40 Maybe one (three dimensionalist) EP solution to the Thinking Part Problem could be to add the criterion that for a 
part of a human animal to be a person it need not only be the non-derivative, primary thinker, but also have certain 
modal properties. In this paper I do not attempt to examine the adequacy of solving the problem in said way.  
41 Ibid.  
42 Olson. ​On Parfit’s View​ . 55-56.  
43 Sider, T. “All the world’s a stage”, ​Australasian Journal of Philosophy​ , Vol 74, No 3, 1996. 
http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.ub.gu.se/10.1080/00048409612347421​.  
44 Olson. ​What Are We?​ . Section 5.8. This does not mean that the stage view is the only four dimensionalist view 
that can solve the problems of EP. Olson (2015) suggests a worm view solution.  
45 Sider. ​All the world’s a stage​ . 451.  
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could a proponent of the stage view deal with this unwanted clash with our intuitions? The 
solution to this which is based on (Sider 1996) includes showing how the stage view is 
compatible with the idea that both identity and psychological continuity matters in persistence, 
and assigning to person stages certain temporal properties. Identity and psychological continuity 
are considered relations between stages. I follow Sider hereinafter and call this sort of relations 
I-relations​ .  Sider’s general definitions of the identity relation and the psychological continuity 46
relation are the following, where M(P*, P) is a four-place relation between two people and two 
times (M = matters, P = person, and the times left are unstated):  
 
(Identity)​  For any person P and any person P* existing at some time in the future, M(P*, P) 47
iff P will be identical to P* then.   48
 
(Psychological continuity)​  For any person P and any person P* existing at some time in the 
future, M(P*, P) iff P's current stage is psychologically continuous with P*'s stage at that time.
  49
 
The aforementioned relations are to be considered analogous with the counterpart relation in 
counterpart theory. So far, your temporal counterparts are still some other people than yourself: it 
seems as if your former experiences did not happen to you but to someone else. This is where the 
temporal properties play their part. Compared to counterpart theory, they are analogous with 
modal properties (eg. “will be” means the same as “possibly”).  So when you make a tensed 50
statement like “I was once a five-year-old child”, the person having the temporal property “was 
once a five-year-old child” is you, and not anyone else. You have these properties in virtue of 
some I-relation holding between you and the stage which you would refer to as the five-year-old 
you. The only thing that is odd here is that this property of yours involves another stage that is 
not you. However, I do not consider this fact odd enough to outdo the feats of the stage view. 
Firstly because it claims that ​you​  really have been five year old (since you have that temporal 
property), and second, the relations holding between you and your temporal counterpart, identity 
and psychological continuity, is sufficient persistence conditions for qualifying as an adequate 
view of persistence. I will return to this topic further on.  
 
Now we can return to the ontological problems. Recall that it concerned the brain-functioning 
brain distinction, which either had the consequence for EP that there were two coextensive 
thinking parts with different modal properties or that the functioning brain was a property of the 
brain, which ended in a surplus of different people sharing spatial extension. In both cases the 
result is that there are too many people. EPS (EP + the stage view, “Embodied Person Stages”) is 
able to avoid both consequences. One way, which is accessible to all temporal-part views, is to 
state that in the case of people there is always just one primary, thinking conscious part: the 
stage. Since we can define this stage as the temporal part of your brain (and ​qua​  temporal part 
includes everything within the brain’s spatial extension for as long as the part exists) there are no 
46 Sider, in turn, borrows the terminology from (Lewis 1983).  
47 Terminology mine.  
48 Ibid. 438.  
49 Ibid. 436.  
50 Ibid. 437.  
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other person candidates, just one stage at a time: what Olson called a sleeping-brain person is 
simply some stage where your brain is asleep (inter alia), and the same goes for the rest of the 
properties of your brain.  This is just one way of solving the ontological problems of EP. In case 51
it is not satisfying enough, there is another more clarifying account of how they can be solved by 
adopting the stage view. Before this is introduced, the I-relations relevant to EPS need to be 
spelled out. In combination with EP, both the identity relation and the psychological-continuity 
relation need to hold between two or more stages for them to be considered person stages. The 
psychological-continuity relation as formulated by Sider will suffice for our purposes, but the 
first relation needs to be rewritten to represent the physical criteria of the narrow criterion:  
 
(The Physical-Continuity Relation)​  For any person P and any person P* existing at some time 
in the future, M(P*, P) iff P will have enough of the same brain as P* then.  
 
Postulate that there are two spatially coincident objects which differ only in respect to some 
temporal properties (which was the case in the new Thinking Part Problem). One of these 
properties is ​existing as an unconscious fetus at t​ , which the functioning brain lacks. We can say 
that:  
 
(1) The brain is such that it has existed as an unconscious fetus at ​t​ .  
 
(2) The functioning brain is not such that it has existed as an unconscious fetus at ​t​ .  
 
To avoid the problem of contradicting properties or too many thinkers, the proponent of the stage 
view can invoke ambiguity in temporal construction. This is the final component of the stage 
view. (1) and (2) are related by the property assigned to the brain by (1) being the property that 
the functioning brain is denied in (2). The relevant ambiguity in this case concerns the question 
of which I-relation holds between which temporal counterparts. Since we know the persistence 
conditions of the brain respectively the functioning brain (which is why the problems arose in the 
first place), and since I-relations are persistence conditions, we can make use of the stage view to 
describe the case accordingly: 
 
(1*) The brain is ​brain I-related​  to something that exists at ​t​ .  
 
(2*) The functioning brain is not ​functioning brain I-related​  to something at ​t​ .  
 
(1*) and (2*) spells out what (1) and (2) means if true. According to the stage view, there can be 
another relation that holds between the brain and the functioning brain, namely the 
lump-of-organic-matter I-relation​ , and this relation still holds between the brain and the 
functioning brain now and their coextensive temporal counterparts at ​t​ .   52
 
Consequently, we have a case of temporary identity since we have shown how the brain and the 
functioning brain can be spatially coextensive without the contradicting properties, viz., they are 
51 Olson. ​On Parfit’s View​ . 55. Olson also mentions these assets of the stage view in (Olson 2007).  
52 Sider. ​All the world’s a stage​ . Section V.  
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identical today but not at ​t​ .  We can say that a person is some stage that holds the proper 53
functioning-brain I-relations​  (which according to EPS is the physical-continuity relation and the 
psychological-continuity relation) to some other stage. If the brain and the functioning brain are 
identical when it matters, that is, when some stage holds the right ​functioning-brain I-relations​  to 
another stage, then it can rightfully be said that there are not two different thinkers because they 
now share all their properties, while we at the same time can account for the different persistence 
conditions, i.e., the I-relations holding between this one stage (which seemed to be two: a brain 
and a functioning brain) and other stages. Since the Thinking Parts problem arose because there 
were two coextensive but non-identical objects, the problem now vanishes. Moving on to the 
Too Many Thinkers Problem, it hinged on the assumption that the functioning brain was a 
property of the brain. We need not accept this assumption since we can show how the 
functioning brain is an object identical to the brain, and accordingly, this problem is eliminated 
as well. If the first solution to the ontological problems was not satisfactory, this might be more 
persuasive. With the stage view and how it solves the ontological problems presented, I find it 
suitable to at last revise the two claims of EP: 
 
(​The ontological claim of EPS​ ) A person is a temporal stage of the thinking conscious part of 
a human animal.  
 
(​The Narrow, Brain-Based I-Relation Criterion​ ) If some future person would be uniquely 
related to me by the Psychological-Continuity Relation, and by the Physical-Continuity 
Relation, this person would be me. If some future person would neither be uniquely related to 
me by the Psychological-Continuity relation, nor by the Physical-Continuity Relation, this 
person would not be me. In all other cases, there would be no answer to the question whether 
some future person would be me.  
2.2. New Problems 
I previously discussed the open texture of “person”, that, to preserve the intuitive strength of his 
view, Parfit might want an account of persistence which respects the fact that the term does not 
tell us what will happen in certain cases. EPS, however, offers a far more exhaustive account of 
both persistence and ontology. Being an account of personal identity, this should be considered a 
strength. But how could a four dimensionalist view such as the stage view, with unintuitive 
claims such as people do not strictly persist, be combined with the intuition-based EP?  
 
I assert that the differences between the two views need not be a problem for EPS, and that there 
actually are similarities between the two, but let us first focus on the problematic aspects of EPS 
and intuition. One might object that 1) it does not match our intuitions about persistence since 
according to them, people persist in a strict sense 2) according to EPS, a larger amount of people 
exist than it does according to our intuitions 3) that EPS is incoherent because our ordinary 
conception of “person” does not allow momentary beings, such as stages, to be people.  To 54
answer these objections, a distinction needs to be introduced, which is crucial to the strength of 
EPS. Following a common four-dimensionalist route, I draw a distinction between our intuitive 
53 Ibid.  
54 Olson. ​What Are We?​ . 127-128.  
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everyday conception of “person”, and the philosopher’s metaphysical definition, and that our 
commonplace talk of persistence is really just the way that best suits our commonplace  
purposes.  EPS has a definition of person in EP that is coherent with ordinary intuitions - this is 55
the work of EP in EPS. EP is the intuitive framework which determines which I-relations hold or 
does not hold between stages, and which stages have which temporary properties, i.e. what can 
and cannot be a person. The stage view explains why we conceive of ourselves as persisting over 
time in a strict sense (because a certain I-relation holds between certain stages/because some 
particular stage has some particular temporal property), but does not claim it to be the most 
efficient way of talking about persistence in everyday life. In other words, EPS is compatible 
with our intuitions because they play a different role - the role of the stage view in EPS is to 
provide with a metaphysical explanation to the nature of personal identity.  
 
Now for the similarities between the stage view and EP. Recall that the narrow criterion makes 
claims such as “If some ​future person​  would be uniquely psychologically continuous with me 
[…] ​this person​  would be me.” , which resembles a four dimensionalist way of talking about 56
personal identity over time in terms of different people. The ontological claim also appears to 
pave the way for a temporal parts ontology by defining a person as a part.  The ambiguity of 57
personal pronouns endorsed by EP resembles the stage view as well, since they both need to 
claim that in several cases, people use personal pronouns to refer to something else than 
themselves. In the same way, a person stage - which is spatially coextensive with the thinking 
part of a human animal - can refer to some other part, namely the body which the thinking part 
inhabits, even though those are numerically different, in the same way as EP.  
 
I have shown an example of how EPS can avoid the ontological problems of EP. How about the 
problems of minimalism? Are minimalism and EPS compatible at all? According to minimalism, 
a true thinker must be made up of ​all and only​  the objects directly involved in its thinking. This 
seems compatible with EPS: the person stage contains in its extension the thinking conscious 
part of a human animal, which in turn is made up of ​all and only​  the objects directly involved in 
its thinking. However, the problems of minimalism seem to remain. EPS does not offer any 
strategy of demarcating which parts of a person’s body are directly involved in its thinking - the 
exact spatial extension of a person stage remains undetermined. The same goes for the third 
problem of minimalism. The person stage contains all the neurons that themselves, according to 
minimalism, are the primary thinker of the thoughts that they govern, and the overlapping 
neurons are still there. However, there seems to be the alternative approaches: either to show that 
EP's need not commit to minimalism, or to accept it and either show how its advantages outdo 
the disadvantages or find a way to solve the problems of minimalism. Anyhow, as mentioned 
earlier, to solve these problems is an area of its own which calls on further research on several 
areas.  
 
Before drawing any conclusions, some objections to the stage view need to be brought up. I have 
already mentioned why it could be seen as a satisfactory account of persistence, but more can be 
55 Ibid. 125-128.  
56 Parfit. ​We Are Not Human Beings​ . 6. Emphasis mine.  
57 In (Olson 2015), Olson mentions how Parfit recurrently has seemed to presuppose an ontology temporal parts, 
although never endorsed one.  
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said concerning its adequacy as such. For example, one consequence of the stage view, as Sider 
points out, is that a present tensed identity statement about a stage that you conceive of as you in 
the past, such as when you point at a picture of yourself as a child, and say, “I ​am​  that 
five-year-old child”, is false according to the stage view. But it will be true to say “I ​was​  that 
five-year-old child”. Is not the latter sentence what we mean when we talk about ourselves?  I 58
certainly am not a five-year-old now, but I certainly was. The truth value of sentences referring 
to some former stage as being presently identical to you, only seems to be a problem if you have 
reason to believe that this kind of sentences need to be true. Another aspect of the stage view that 
can be deterring is that identity holds between (different) stages and not one and the same object. 
However, this is a trait that all four dimensionalist views share, so this objection is only available 
for three dimensionalists and is not fatal unless four dimensionalism is shown to be false.   59
 
One can also object simply by claiming that the stage view analysis of persistence is too 
far-fetched and not to be considered an adequate account of persistence, since we do not think 
about persistence as I-relations and temporal properties concerning other person stages. Sider’s 
answer to this is that the common-sense foundation of talk of persistence is simply that things 
generally have temporal properties, which they do according to the stage view. Everything else is 
theoretical, and therefore, if the stage view is the most beneficial analysis of persistence, it 
should be allowed to be unconventional.   60
 
The final objection I will rehearse here concerns the infinite amount of person stages that exists 
according to the stage view. In the case of timeless counting, with there being infinitely many 
stages between one moment and another, the stage view needs to accept talk of aggregates or 
stages, or space time worms. This undermines the stage view because some of the arguments 
Sider builds his view on rely on that the objects we quantify over do not coincide,  and since 61
space time worms sometimes do, this is a problem. Sider claims that this need not amount to too 
much trouble, arguing first that he need not say that objects ​never​  coincide, and second that it is 
only in cases such as timeless counting that we talk about worms rather than stages, but in almost 
all other cases, stages suffices for our purposes - it depends on where our interests lie.  Sider 62
admits that this weakens the appeal of the view, although not fatally, but there are other worries. 
According to Joshua Stuchlik, the stage view seems to presume an atomistic view of time, which 
puts the view in the inconvenient position where it either needs to rule out that time is gunky, or 
accept worm theory.   63
3. Conclusion  
In this paper I started off by presenting EP and criticism it has received. By formulating EP as 
committed to the ontological claim and the narrow criterion, I hope to have shown how Olson’s 
first objection against the EP account of persistence did not apply. EP combined with the stage 
58 Sider. 446.  
59 Ibid. 447.  
60 Sider. 447.  
61 Ibid. Section V.  
62 Ibid. 448-449.  
63 Stuchlik, J.M. “Not All Worlds Are Stages”, ​Philosophical Studies,​  116: 309, 2003. 
doi:10.1023/B:PHIL.0000007237.51867.14.  
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view resulted in a more exhaustive account of not only personal ontology, but personal identity 
at large, than the one proposed by Parfit. Although the problems of minimalism remain for EPS, 
though their impact is still unclear, the ontological objections could be met successfully by EP 
adopting the stage view. To answer the new problems of the stage view is vital for EPS. Even 
though the pursue to solve these issues is outside scope of this paper, I hope that I will have 
shown the project of combining EP with an ontology of temporal parts to be a promising task to 
engage in for anyone with Lockean preferences and a friendly enough attitude towards four 
dimensionalism.  
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